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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RAYMOND CARL CASTANEDA,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 45279
Canyon County Case No.
CR-2016-2269

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Castaneda failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and suspending his driver’s license for five
years, upon his guilty plea to felony DUI (prior felony DUI within 15 years), with a persistent
violator enhancement?

Castaneda Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Castaneda pled guilty to felony DUI (prior felony DUI within 15 years), with a persistent
violator enhancement, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.98-99.)
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The district court also suspended

Castaneda’s driving privileges for five years. (R., pp.98-99.) Following the period of retained
jurisdiction, the district court suspended Castaneda’s sentence and placed him on supervised
probation. (Aug., pp.12-14.) Castaneda filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.101-05.)
Castaneda asserts his underlying sentence and five-year driver’s license suspension are
excessive in light of his alcohol abuse, family support, acceptance of responsibility, and
purported remorse and motivation to remain sober. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.) The record
supports the sentence imposed and the five-year driver’s license suspension.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
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reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The penalty for felony DUI (prior felony DUI within 15 years), with a persistent violator
enhancement, is not less than five years, up life in prison, with a driver’s license suspension of
not less than one year, up to five years. I.C. §§ 18-8005(6), -8005(9), 19-2514. The district
court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, with a five-year driver’s
license suspension, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.

(R., pp.98-99.)

Furthermore, Castaneda’s underlying sentence and driver’s license suspension are reasonable in
light of the seriousness of the offense, Castaneda’s continued criminal offending, the danger he
presents to the community, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred.
Castaneda has an “extensive criminal history beginning as a juvenile.” (PSI, pp.5-11,
20. 1) He began illegally consuming alcohol at age 13 and using marijuana at age 14. (PSI,
pp.17, 48.) He subsequently incurred juvenile adjudications for habitual truancy, three counts of
burglary, three counts of grand theft, and three counts of petit theft; convictions for failure to
purchase/invalid driver’s license, providing false information to an officer, reckless driving,
leaving the scene of an accident involving damage, two convictions for possession of tobacco by
a minor, three convictions for minor in possession of alcohol, three convictions for DWP, three
prior convictions for DUI, two convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm; and multiple
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Castaneda Conf.
Exhibit #45279.pdf.”
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probation violations. (PSI, pp.5-12.) Castaneda spent approximately five years in prison, during
which time he incurred DOR’s for being discovered in possession of “approximately 3 cans of
tobacco, individually wrapped” during an “unclothed body search,” “arranging for tobacco drops
to be made and brought onto the SICI compound,” and “drinking [alcohol] and driving during his
work search.” (PSI, p.12; 6/19/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-4.)
Castaneda failed to rehabilitate or be deterred by prior legal sanctions and treatment
opportunities. Despite spending time on felony probation and eventually topping out his time in
prison for his last felony DUI, Castaneda maintained his belief that “it is okay to drink and drive
as long as he does not hurt anyone.” (APSI, p.2 (Augmentation); PSI, pp.12-13; 6/19/17 Tr., p.7,
Ls.1-6.) In the instant offense, he consumed “approximately 12 Coronas” (PSI, p.3) and “rac[ed]
a Mustang … through Canyon County in Caldwell” (6/19/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-21). When an
officer “‘pulled [Castaneda] over for speeding and swerving’” into the oncoming lane of traffic,
Castaneda “advised that he kn[ew] that he [was] too drunk to be driving.” (PSI, pp.3, 5, 44.)
Castaneda subsequently failed field sobriety testing and breath tests yielded results of .174/.168
BAC – more than twice the legal limit.

(PSI, p.44.)

Although he told the presentence

investigator that alcohol is the “problem area or factor in his life that has contributed most to his
legal problems,” Castaneda continued to drink while this case was pending, admitting during his
May 2017 presentence interview that he had consumed alcohol just a few weeks earlier. (PSI,
pp.17-18, 20.) Notably, Castaneda did not participate in any substance abuse treatment or selfhelp groups prior to sentencing, despite the fact that he committed the instant offense in February
2016 and therefore had over 16 months in which to do so. (PSI, p.49.) The presentence
investigator determined that Castaneda presents a moderate risk to reoffend and concluded,
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“Based upon his documented criminal record and continued use of alcohol [Castaneda] does not
appear to be an appropriate candidate for community supervision at this time.” (PSI, pp.19-20.)
At sentencing, the state recommended a rider and an overall unified sentence 17 years,
with five years fixed, arguing, “The defendant's blow was twice the legal limit. He was seen -admitted racing the car earlier. He clearly hasn't learned his lesson from his prior DUI and his
prior federal case to never drink and drive again, so we think that's important.” (6/19/17 Tr., p.5,
L.23 – p.6, L.7.) The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a
reasonable sentence of only 10 years, with five years fixed, suspended Castaneda’s driving
privileges for five years, and granted him the opportunity to participate in the retained
jurisdiction program. (R., pp.98-99.) Castaneda’s sentence and driver’s license suspension are
appropriate in light of the perilous nature of the offense, Castaneda’s ongoing alcohol abuse and
criminal offending, his repeated decisions to endanger the community by driving while
intoxicated, his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred, and the danger he presents to society. Given
any reasonable view of the facts, Castaneda has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Castaneda’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 23rd day of February, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of February, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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